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1 Introduction
Recent regulatory initiatives have focused on fair treatment of customers in financial markets.
For instance, the Financial Services Authority in the UK stipulates:1
A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. [It]
must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information
to them in a way which is clear, fair and not misleading. [It] must manage conflicts of
interest fairly, both between itself and its customers and between a customer and another
client.
In many cases, successful implementation requires attention to details of which most clients
may be unaware. This paper examines the agency problem created by an asset manager with
market impact, segregated accounts and preference-based contracts. It shows that when it
comes to execution quality, the manager has natural incentives not to act as envisaged by the
regulation.
Practical asset management often involves portfolio rebalancing in markets with insuf-
ficient depth. Positions in small caps or illiquid emerging market stocks, for instance, are
usually quite difficult to adjust without price effects and this regards, at least temporarily, a
very broad range of securities in times of financial crisis such as that of the late 2000s. Large
institutional investors are well aware of their market impact and are forced to incorporate it
in their trading strategies.
In general, execution quality is an important issue for any investor.2 Due to the effect of
compounding, poor execution can result in substantial losses in a large frequently-rebalanced
portfolio managed over a long period of time. This explains the recent growth in algorithmic
trading and expansion of various dark pools of liquidity3 as well as other mechanisms aimed
at limiting price impact, such as iceberg orders with their full size hidden.4 Nevertheless,
market impact will not disappear entirely for large traders, even if the execution is spread over
several days.5 In fact, there are commercial analytical tools available to market participants
specifically designed for portfolio optimization in the presence of price impact.6
As a consequence, a large asset manager with multiple clients7 may strategically trade
their accounts in such a way that some bear a disproportionately greater burden of the market
impact costs than others. This is equivalent to invisible transfers between client accounts and
even though they may seem relatively negligible, their impact on clients’ final wealth can be
quite noticeable. While for sophisticated market participants, e.g. at the interdealer trading
level, it is simply their job to know whereabouts in the packet of orders they stand, there
is a sizable segment of the market populated by much less informed participants. From less
sophisticated institutional investors all the way down to the retail level, presumably a large
number of clients are either genuinely unaware of the possibility of such arrangements or face
prohibitive monitoring costs relative to their size. Such a client base allows for unobserved
1See Principles for Businesses No. 6-8 in the FSA Handbook at www.fsa.gov.uk. Similarly, rules on fair
dealing with customers in the US can be found at www.finra.org.
2Bessembinder (2003) and Zhao and Chung (2007), for instance, show how institutional and regulatory
changes in the past led to improvement in average execution quality.
3See e.g. Domowitz et al. (2008).
4De Winne and D’Hondt (2007) analyze their general strategic use in practice.
5In such a case, other costs enter into play as well. See Cai and Sofianos (2006).
6See e.g. Sofianos et al. (2007).
7See O’Cinneide et al. (2006) and Satchell and Scherer (2010) for pioneering work on multi-account portfolio
optimization.
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discretionary order flow prioritization by the manager, should there be incentives for that and
should detection and enforcement of a potential explicit regulatory ban on such practices be
weak.
There is more to transaction costs of portfolio management than market impact, such
as brokerage commissions, fees charged by lenders of securities for short-selling or taxes.
This paper, however, focuses specifically on the issue of market impact and the opacity with
which the resulting loss might be distributed among clients, regardless of fairness or welfare
considerations.8 In particular, we show that even in the absence of pure favouritism, a rational
manager interested primarily in her fee income will generally have incentives towards client
discrimination. It is apparent that the problem is of substantial interest to clients, asset
managers, regulators and supervisors alike. Our analysis seeks to provide relevant insights
and stimulate further discussion by both academics and practitioners.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a motivating example of single-
account portfolio optimization with market impact, Section 3 outlines the main features of
the multi-account optimization problem and Section 4 builds the microstructure framework
in which the problem will be analyzed. Sections 5 and 6 then illustrate that distribution of
market impact costs can be viewed as distribution of the manager’s total alpha among her
clients and that ordering of client trades affects not only the way in which the ‘alpha pie’
is sliced, with the corresponding welfare implications, but generally also its size. Section 7
demonstrates how a simple single-price rule takes such discretion away from the manager and
enforces fair client treatment. Section 8 concludes.
2 Price Impact and Portfolio Choice
To motivate the problem, let us present a simple example of portfolio choice by a large investor
with market impact. Suppose she has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over
her terminal wealth as popularly used in theoretical research. In particular, let the coefficient
of relative risk aversion be unity. There are two types of securities, riskless and risky, and the
investor allocates her wealth W between them so that her expected utility is maximized.
Formally, the investor’s expected utility is
E
[
u
(
W˜T
)]
= E
(
log W˜T
)
(1)
where
W˜T = W · [1 + rf + ϕ · (r˜ − rf )] (2)
is her terminal wealth, rf is the rate of return on the riskless security and ϕ is the fraction of
wealth allocated to the risky security which provides the rate of return
r˜ =
P˜T
P
− 1 (3)
8Broadly speaking, there are many areas in which the principal-agent relationship in delegated portfolio
management opens up a possibility for inefficient outcomes. These include, for instance, soft dollar arrange-
ments (excess commissions to broker-dealers in exchange for additional services and favours, such as research
or preferential IPO allocations) or payment for order flow (by stock exchanges or market makers to brokers
for directing orders to them). However, unlike these previously addressed transparency issues, our analysis is
largely confined to invisible in-house transfers of wealth with no external party directly benefiting from such
undisclosed practices. In a certain sense, the manager’s fiduciary duty is fully honoured in the aggregate and
no Pareto improvement is possible.
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with P˜T being the (stochastic) terminal price of the security and P being its purchase price.
If the risk premium is E(r˜)− rf > 0, then the optimal allocation is ϕ∗ > 0.9 With an ex-
ogenously specified distribution of returns, it is a standard result that the fraction of wealth
allocated to risky securities by CRRA investors is independent of their wealth.10
In practice, however, if the size of the investor’s trade is large relative to the average
trading volume of the security per the relevant time interval, this itself tends to result in
a price movement that cannot be ignored. The larger the investor’s wealth, the larger her
demand for the risky security tends to be and hence the higher the (average) price P per unit
of that security that she ends up paying.11 As demonstrated in the Appendix, ϕ∗ is strictly
decreasing in P and so in effect, the investor’s optimal allocation to risky securities increases
less than proportionately with her wealth.
This example illustrates in the standard expected utility framework that ignoring price
impact, calculating optimal demand at the prevailing market price and simply submitting a
market order for that quantity is likely to lead to systematic errors resulting in suboptimal
portfolio allocations and welfare loss.
3 Multi-Account Portfolio Optimization
We will examine a closely related practical problem faced by a large asset management com-
pany with market impact which has multiple clients and seeks to optimally allocate their
individual portfolios. Not only does the manager have to incorporate price impact into indi-
vidual clients’ optimization but she also has the power to determine how the total loss due to
this price impact is distributed among the clients. In general, a sophisticated manager will
be maximizing her expected utility
v = v
(
f˜ , v∗1, . . . , v
∗
N
)
(4)
where f˜ is the value of the fees she receives for her services and v∗i is the maximized expected
utility of client i conditional on the market prices at the time of trading on behalf of that
client. All of the arguments depend on the manager’s actions at present, particularly the
order in which she sequentially trades clients’ accounts and thus determines the distribution
of the market impact costs. In general, she can split each client’s order into a number of
smaller orders and then trade these so-called ‘clips’ in any sequence she likes.
The key contribution of this paper is in pointing out that the perception of f˜ by a sophis-
ticated manager will generally vary with her actions in this respect. Even if she honours every
single contract individually by maximizing each client’s welfare given the market conditions,
the fact that she co-creates those conditions provides her with some wiggle room for pursuing
her own agenda. How she does that depends on the specification of (4). For instance, a
benevolent manager may maximize what she views as aggregate client welfare
∑N
i=1 ωi · v∗i
irrespective of the impact on f˜ . Alternatively, cognizant of the problems with welfare aggre-
gation, she may pursue fairness by distributing market impact costs in proportion to the size
of client trades. At the other extreme, she may optimize her fee income regardless of fairness
or aggregate client well-being. The latter may involve systematic favouring of some clients at
the cost of others if that is what the manager deems instrumental to greater fees.
9This is true for any nonsatiated risk-averse investor. See Arrow (1971).
10Ibid.
11No price impact is assumed in the market for the riskless security.
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Experience suggests that the case of a self-interested manager is likely to be the most
relevant. In the following, we will examine the problem through a series of analytically
tractable examples with contracts based on mean-variance preferences as utilized, rightly or
wrongly, by a large number of practitioners.
4 Basic Microstructure
Let us consider an economy with two assets, a riskfree bond and a risky stock index. There is
a large asset management company and a lot of small independent institutional and individual
investors. Within the time frame available for trading, the residual supply and demand faced
by the large asset manager are perfectly elastic in the case of bonds but imperfectly so in
the case of stocks.12 Technically, stocks are traded in an order-driven market and the large
investor, demanding liquidity/immediacy, submits a market order which hits limit orders
placed by the rest of the market. This moves the price away from its pre-trade level p, which
is the price that would prevail in the market in the absence of the large trader, and the degree
of market resilience is such that the price will start reverting to that level only after the
execution horizon of the large trader has elapsed.13
Pricing is discriminatory, i.e. if the quantity in the market order exceeds the quantity at
the best available price, all orders at that price are matched and then the market order walks
up/down the book, matching limit orders at less favourable prices. Specifically, we assume
that the tick is infinitesimally small, the price grid in the limit order book is continuous and
for the market depth parameter δ > 0,
K(p) = δ · |p− p| (5)
describes the cumulative quantity on the bid and ask side of the book for p < p and p > p,
respectively.14 The depth on both sides is limited, i.e. K(p) is constant for p below or
above a certain price threshold, but if the size of the market order exceeds the depth of the
book, additional orders will arrive to extend the range in which (5) holds, reflecting partly
the genuine reservation prices due to heterogenous beliefs of additional buyers or sellers and
partly their exploitation of the presence of the large trader who needs to trade within a certain
time frame.15
The large investor submits a market order with the quantity Q such that Q > 0 if it is a
bid and Q < 0 if it is an ask. Then, given16
p(q) = p+
q
δ
(6)
as implied by (5), the average share price for the investor is
P (Q) =
1
Q
·
∫ Q
0
p(q) dq = p+
Q
2 · δ (7)
12Thus, in the stock market, the large investor involuntarily plays the role of an ‘elephant in the pool’.
13See e.g. Degryse et al. (2005) for an empirical analysis of market resilience.
14For simplicity of exposition, both sides of the book are linear and equally sloped. This is relaxed only
later when it is relevant to the analysis.
15Thus, part of the market impact may be due to front-running traders who learn ahead that a large market
order is due.
16In this framework, every infinitesimal share of stock in the market can trade at a different price and so for
any bid (ask) order q > 0 (q < 0) between 0 and Q, p(q) is the price of the marginal share bought (sold).
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and the market impact cost is
C(Q) =
[
P (Q)− p] ·Q = Q2
2 · δ . (8)
Intuitively, an increase in the measure of market depth δ reduces the market impact cost.
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the asset management company has two
clients with trading needs Q1 and Q2 such that Q1 > −Q2 > 0.17 We will now illustrate some
of the options the asset manager has to execute the trades. One option is to simply route the
orders to the market,18 which will result in the market impact costs C(Q1) for client 1 and
C(Q2) for client 2. Alternatively, the quantity N ∈ [0,−Q2] could be matched in-house at
some internal terms of trade and only the residual market orders for the quantities Q1 −N
and Q2 +N would then be sent for execution to the market. Regarding the costs of price
impact, we can state the following general result.
Proposition 1: For any given buy and sell orders from clients and a continuous nondecreas-
ing p(q) such that p(0) = p, the aggregate market impact costs are minimized through maximal
internalization of trading, i.e. netting orders in-house.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Thus, the total loss due to market impact is minimized if N = −Q2 is traded in-house and
only Q1 +Q2 is submitted to the market. In theory, however, the objective of the asset man-
ager may not necessarily be to minimize the aggregate price impact costs, especially if those
are borne by the clients themselves on top of explicit fees and charges. While fair customer
treatment in terms of the latter may be required by regulation, the timing of internalization
and the resulting terms of in-house trade might open an opportunity for client discrimination.
In particular, internalization takes place at the price currently prevailing in the market and
so it is at the discretion of the manager to determine at which stage of the price-moving
transaction partial netting takes place.
To allow for differing depth of the ask and bid side of the limit order book in the following
exposition, let δ = δ1 on the ask side and δ = δ2 on the bid side of the book with the sub-
stitutions made in (5)-(8) correspondingly. For each N , the manager can establish the price
pN ∈ [p(Q2 +N), p(Q1 −N)] for a moment by routing only the relevant fraction of either the
ask Q2 +N or the bid Q1 −N to the market, trade N shares in-house at pN and only then
complete the transaction by submitting the remainder of the total market order.19
If client 1 is the ‘in-house favourite’ and the manager minimizes the price of the block
of shares purchased on behalf of this client, then obviously pN = p(Q2 +N) and the formal
17For now, assume those are fixed irrespective of price fluctuations.
18We consider a single-arrival market in which each of the two market orders is matched with the existing
limit orders as opposed to a batch-arrival market in which market orders are matched at the prevailing price
and only the net order flow reaches the limit order book. In the latter framework, however, the same would
be achieved by submitting either bids or asks with sufficient delay, assuming no relevant limit order book
innovations in the meantime.
19Here, internal crossing of complementary orders of size N takes place at the most recent execution price pN
as the initial market order walks up/down the book. Alternatively, it could be the mid-price between the best
bid and best ask following the execution of that order. Unlike our stylized model in which the bid-ask spread
widens with no response from other market participants, newly arriving bids and asks in practice would tend
to tighten it. More importantly, the manager in our model could submit a dummy order, namely a single-share
limit order arbitrarily close to pN , to attain the same price for internalization. For instance, Kazakov and
Vasak (2006) report frequent use of single-share orders to establish one-tick bid-ask spreads at the Australian
Stock Exchange as a result of specific rules for on-exchange crossing of orders below 1 million AUD. (Larger
orders can be crossed off-exchange with no pricing rules imposed.)
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problem becomes
min
N∈[0,−Q2]
{
P (Q1 −N) · (Q1 −N) + p(Q2 +N) ·N
}
, (9)
which is solved by
N∗ = min
{
Q1 − δ1δ2 ·Q2
1 + 2 · δ1δ2
,−Q2
}
. (10)
This implies that as long as
Q1 < −Q2 ·
(
1 +
δ1
δ2
)
, (11)
the strategy of the asset manager that optimizes the overall terms of trade of client 1 results in
incomplete internalization N∗ ∈ (0,−Q2) and inefficiently high aggregate price impact costs,
of which client 2 bears a disproportionately large part.20
It is straightforward to show that where (11) holds,
dN∗
d δ1δ2
< 0 (12)
and so if there were an increase in the depth of the ask side of the book and/or a decrease
in the depth of the bid side of the book, it would be optimal to dump a larger part of the
order of client 2, namely Q2 +N
∗, in the market to depress the price temporarily and trade
a smaller part of that order, namely N∗, in-house at that price because such manipulation
would improve the overall terms of trade for client 1 at the expense of client 2.21
In practice, incomplete internalization would also give rise to extra transaction costs, but
that might not necessarily invalidate the optimality of such a strategy if there were incentives
to discriminate and no alternative means to do so. If we redefine client 2 as an aggregate of
small clients with high relative costs22 of switching to another asset management company,
asset managers may indeed have incentives to compete with their rivals for large clients and
grant them preferential treatment in equilibrium.
More relevantly, let us consider a situation in which the clients need to trade in the same
direction, i.e. Q1 ·Q2 > 0. For notational simplicity, let us readopt a single δ for both sides of
the order book as in (5)-(8). The aggregate price impact costs will be C(Q1 +Q2) but their
distribution across the clients is determined by the order in which the asset manager trades
their accounts. In particular, if the account of client i ∈ {1, 2} is traded first, she incurs C(Qi)
and, consequently, the other client incurs C(Q1 +Q2)− C(Qi). Given
C(Q1 +Q2) = C(Q1) + C(Q2) + ξ(Q1, Q2) (13)
where
ξ(Q1, Q2) =
Q1 ·Q2
δ
, (14)
20Client 2 bears C(Q2 +N |δ = δ2) + τ(N) while client 1 only C(Q1 −N |δ = δ1)− τ(N) of the aggregate
price impact costs where τ(N) = (p− pN ) ·N = −δ−12 ·N · (Q2 +N) ≥ 0 is effectively an invisible transfer
from the account of client 2 to the account of client 1.
21Since limδ1/δ2→+∞N
∗ = −Q2
2
, at least a half of the order of client 2 will always be internalized.
22The costs include, but are not limited to, time and effort associated with information acquisition and
market analysis relative to the wealth at stake. Anecdotal evidence suggests that once a client has selected
an asset manager, it takes a relatively strong impulse for her to switch, for which disproportionate sharing of
hidden market impact costs seems unlikely to qualify.
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the cost of being traded last is ξ and, effectively, it is at the discretion of the manager to
decide from whose account this amount is taken.23
While fees and charges are relatively easily observable and verifiable by the clients, their
priority queue in market access is not. Pure favouritism aside, a natural question of interest
is whether there is some optimal way, from the perspective of the manager, of distributing ξ
among uncoordinated clients who are largely unaware of its existence and observe only the
total performance of their own portfolios. This is what we explore next.
5 Slicing of the Alpha Pie and Its Welfare Implications
Invariably, sophisticated investors can only achieve superior performance with a portfolio of
limited size. By definition, no investment strategy can deliver excess profits with any amount
of assets and in practice, the restriction on the volume of trades that can exploit existing
mispricing and generate superior returns is likely to be relatively tight. This phenomenon is
sometimes termed ‘alpha decay’, suggesting that the (marginal) alpha on the extra unit of
money invested diminishes as the market moves against the investor.
For a given stock price p prevailing in the market, let alpha be defined as
α = pe − p (15)
where pe is the price level at which the expected return is justified by its risk as defined by the
relevant equilibrium asset pricing model for the economy.24 A sophisticated investor identifies
mispricing through what she perceives to be a superior forecast of the future price of equity
with the forecast error being incorporated in its risk.25 Then, for p given by (6), the excess
profit (dollar alpha) that the investor generates with an order of size Q is
Π(Q) =
∫ Q
0
α(q) dq = (pe − p) ·Q− C(Q), (16)
which is maximized at Q̂ = δ · (pe − p) such that p
(
Q̂
)
= pe.
Thus, we can reframe the above problem of distributing market impact costs as the asset
manager’s problem of distributing her alpha among the clients. Π is referred to as the ‘alpha
pie’ that is effectively sliced and distributed by the manager through her actions taken on
behalf of the clients. In particular, different client ordering results in different slicing.26 In
general, the quantity traded by the manager will not be Q̂ but the investment company has
incentives to expand by attracting new clients if it consistently underexploits the excess profit
opportunities it is able to identify and, similarly, it has incentives not to overgrow.27
In the exposition above, clients’ equity demand was fixed regardless of the execution price.
Optimal demand derived from their preferences, however, generally varies with the price as
23For Q1 > −Q2 > 0, −ξ is the amount saved in-house by internalization such that C(Q2) is saved by client 2
and −ξ − C(Q2) > C(Q2) by client 1.
24For expositional purposes, alpha is defined in terms of price levels rather than rates of return. The concept
may be less clear in this introductory setting with a single risky asset but it becomes more meaningful in a
framework with multiple risky assets.
25Whether she is right or wrong is not pertinent to the analysis of her motives. Cf. Jezek (2009).
26Note that Π(Q1 +Q2) = Π(Q1) + Π(Q2)− ξ(Q1, Q2).
27Unlike investment banks, the asset management company does not engage in proprietary trading, i.e. does
not buy or sell securities for its own account. Perold and Salomon (1991) address the issue of the optimal
amount of assets under management.
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illustrated in Section 2 and so Q1 and Q2 also depend on the order in which client accounts
are traded. The rational manager, trading on behalf of the clients based on their risk profiles
and wealth, is aware of that and by the choice of their ordering, she may pursue her own
objectives while still honouring her obligation to optimize each client’s portfolio conditional
on the current market price and the (expected) price impact of the transaction.
Let the preferences of client i over his terminal wealth W˜T i = W˜T i(Qi) be represented by
the mean-variance utility function
Vi(Qi) = E
(
W˜T i
)
− ρi
2
· var
(
W˜T i
)
(17)
where ρi > 0 is a measure of aversion to absolute
28 portfolio volatility.29 Initially, the client
holds no stocks.30 His wealth is Wi and the manager allocates it on his behalf between stocks
and bonds based on her probabilistic assessment of the terminal stock price P˜T and the client’s
preferences as in (17). Thus,
W˜T i = [Wi − p ·Qi − C(Qi)− I(i) · ξ(Q1, Q2)] · (1 + rf ) + P˜T ·Qi (18)
where
I(i) =
{
0 if i is traded first
1 if i is traded last
(19)
and rf is the riskfree rate of return on bonds.
Hence, if the manager maximizes the utility of client i conditional on I(i), the size of the
market order submitted on his behalf is31
Q∗i =
E
(
P˜T
)
− (1 + rf ) ·
[
p+ I(i) · δ−1 ·Qj
]
(1 + rf ) · δ−1 + ρi · var
(
P˜T
) , (20)
which depends on the quantity traded on behalf of client j 6= i if I(i) = 1. As demonstrated
in the Appendix, this implies
[Q∗1 +Q
∗
2]12 = [Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2]21 (21)
and
[V ∗1 + V
∗
2 ]12 ≥ [V ∗1 + V ∗2 ]21 ⇐⇒ ρ1 ≤ ρ2 (22)
where V ∗i = Vi(Q
∗
i ) and the result inside the brackets [ ]ij is obtained for I(i) = 1− I(j) = 0.
28See the next section for an alternative mean-variance specification in which ρi measures aversion to relative
portfolio volatility.
29The objective function can be viewed as the certainty equivalent of W˜Ti under normality and constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences with the coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρi. Since, however,
neither normality nor CARA are realistic, we consider it an inferred index of client welfare over portfolio
composition without necessarily embracing the expected utility framework in which variance is not an exact
measure of risk [Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)]. Thus, increases in expected wealth are desirable but there is a
penalty for an ad hoc measure of portfolio volatility. Crude as this may seem in the light of economic theory, ρi
is often the best that practitioners can establish about the client risk profile and mean-variance specifications
are widespread in actual investment houses.
30In a dynamic context, we might interpret it as a situation in which the stock price forecast in the previous
rebalancing period was such that it has been optimal to hold bonds only.
31No short-selling constraints are in place.
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Thus, although individual contracts obligate the manager to maximize the welfare of
each client conditional on current market prices by submitting a market order for the optimal
quantity correctly derived from the client’s risk profile, market impact introduces an additional
dimension for optimization by the manager since she co-determines the market prices and the
order in which she trades the clients’ accounts matters. In this case, ordering of clients does
not affect the aggregate quantity traded by the asset management company but it does affect
aggregate welfare as measured by the simple summation of each client’s welfare index (17).
In particular, the manager will maximize aggregate welfare if she grants priority in market
access to the client with less aversion to portfolio volatility. Effectively, as is apparent from
(20), preferential market access is thus given to the client who wishes to trade more if allowed
in the market first. The initial client wealth Wi is irrelevant for the results.
In sum, client ordering has no effect on the size of the alpha pie produced by the manager
as measured by (16) but can well serve as an instrument for its slicing and distribution to
the clients in a welfare-maximizing fashion. Before the application of this tool, however, the
manager needs to establish what the relevant objective functions of the clients are and address
the issue of their aggregation since that might affect the optimality of her actions.
For instance, let the clients have CARA preferences and P˜T be normally distributed. Then,
by the standard properties of the lognormal distribution,32 the expected utility of client i is
E
[
ui
(
W˜T i
)]
= E
[
− 1
ρi
· e−ρi·W˜Ti
]
= − 1
ρi
· e−ρi·Vi(Qi) = ui [Vi(Qi)] (23)
with Vi given by (17). Since u
′
i > 0, the optimal demand for equity is (20) and so (21) still
holds. However, aggregate welfare defined as
E
[
u1
(
W˜T1
)]
+ w · E
[
u2
(
W˜T2
)]
, (24)
where w > 0 is a parameter capturing the clients’ relative importance to the manager,33 does
not necessarily lead to the same optimal ordering as implied by (22).
In the absence of an analytical solution, numerical results are presented graphically in
Figure 1. They show that clients’ initial wealth Wi matters and as client 2 becomes wealth-
ier, ceteris paribus, the region in the space of coefficients of absolute risk aversion in which
aggregate welfare is maximized by trading that client first shrinks, suggesting that a benev-
olent asset manager would tend to distribute her alpha preferentially to less wealthy clients.
Also, it shows that the weight w placed on client 2 would have to rise exponentially as W2
increases in order to offset this effect.34
We have demonstrated that there are welfare consequences of the distribution of the
manager’s alpha among the clients through discriminatory market access. The construction
of the aggregate welfare index by an asset manager seeking in-house welfare improvement
should be based on careful inferences about clients’ individual preferences and possibly the
manager’s broader objectives in terms of their relative importance. Clearly, if the manager
pursues the objective of maximizing the aggregate certainty equivalent of true CARA clients
as effectively done in (22), the action she takes might be suboptimal. On the other hand, it
32E(ez) = eE(z)+
1
2
·var(z) for a normal z.
33Any positive affine transformation of the utility function ui represents the same preferences and so w
accounts for that as well.
34By relevant substitutions and rearrangement of (24), it can be shown easily that any deviation of W2 from
W1, ceteris paribus, is neutralized if w is adjusted by a factor of e
ρ2·(1+rf )·(W2−W1).
10
Figure 1: Numerical results for CARA preferences given δ = 10, rf = 0.01, p = 1, E(P˜T ) = 1.1
and var(P˜T ) = 0.15
2. EU = E(u1) + w · E(u2).
might be the preferred action if the risk-adjusted expected wealth in (17) approximates true
welfare over investments better than (23).
6 Client Ordering and the Size of the Alpha Pie
Let us make a slight adjustment to the specification of clients’ investment preferences. We
remain in the mean-variance framework as it is widely utilized by practitioners and specify
the welfare index of client i as35
Vi(ϕi) = Wi ·
[
1 + E (r˜pi)− ρi
2
· var (r˜pi)
]
(25)
where
r˜pi = rf + ϕi · (r˜i − rf ) (26)
is the portfolio rate of return, ϕi is a fraction of the wealth Wi allocated to stocks and
r˜i =
P˜T
P i
− 1 (27)
is the rate of return on stocks with P i being the average price in the trade on behalf of client i.
Thus, the client has mean-variance preferences over the portfolio rate of return rather than
final wealth as in (17). As a result, (25) exhibits the empirically appealing ‘CRRA feature’
35Cf. (44) in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Numerical results for mean-variance preferences over the portfolio rate of re-
turn given rf = 0.01, p = 1, E(P˜T ) = 1.1, var(P˜T ) = 0.15
2, W1 = 10 · 106, W2 = 100 · 106,
ρ1 = ρ2 = 5 and when fixed, δ = 3 · 108. ΣQ = Q∗1 +Q∗2, ΣV = V ∗1 + V ∗2 and ΣPQ =
P 1 ·Q∗1 + P 2 ·Q∗2.
that for a fixed distribution of stock returns, i.e. with no market impact, the proportion of
the portfolio allocated to stocks is independent of wealth.36 Again, ρi is often the best that a
practitioner is realistically able to establish about the client’s risk profile with variance being
merely a widely used ad hoc measure of portfolio volatility as a proxy for risk.
Let us also generalize the manager’s market impact function. For now, let (5) become
K(p) = δ · |p− p| 1k (28)
for k > 0 so that (6) becomes
p(q) = p+ (sgn q) ·
∣∣∣q
δ
∣∣∣k , (29)
allowing for nonlinear (power) price impact.
With two clients, the manager can sequentially trade their accounts as in the previous
section and Figure 2 illustrates the outcomes for specific parameter values. It shows that
with a strictly convex price impact (k > 1), given that the coefficient of aversion to portfolio
volatility ρi is the same for both clients, the optimal quantity of stocks (and hence their
monetary value) traded on behalf of the clients is larger if the larger client is traded first.
That way, aggregate client welfare measured as a simple sum of the individual welfare indices
V ∗i = Vi(ϕ
∗
i ) is maximized as well. Note that for k < 1, although such a strictly concave price
36Whereas in (17), it is the amount invested in stocks that is independent of wealth.
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Ordering 12 Ordering 21
p(Q∗1 +Q∗2) 1.03523 1.03640
P 1 1.00023 1.03347
P 2 1.01363 1.01021
P 1 ·Q∗1 7.94 · 106 4.89 · 106
P 2 ·Q∗2 49.03 · 106 53.04 · 106∑2
i=1 P i ·Q∗i 56.97 · 106 57.93 · 106
Table 1: A numerical example under a quadratic price impact (k = 2) given
δ = 3 · 108, rf = 0.01, p = 1, E(P˜T ) = 1.1, var(P˜T ) = 0.152, W1 = 10 · 106, W2 = 100 · 106 and
ρ1 = ρ2 = 5.
impact is presumably less realistic, ordering 21 leads to larger aggregate welfare but smaller
aggregate stock holdings than ordering 12 and it is only for k = 1 that either ordering results
in the same size of the equity portfolio under the management of the investment company.
The figure also illustrates how changes in the market depth parameter δ affect the outcomes.
Intuitively, the clients wish to buy more stocks in deeper markets with smaller losses due to
price impact.
As a particular numerical example, Table 1 provides the outcomes for each client ordering
if the price impact is quadratic (k = 2), namely the price p(Q∗1+Q∗2) of the last share purchased
by the manager in the market, the average equity price P i for each client and the monetary
value P i ·Q∗i of the equity block purchased on behalf of each client. Given that the wealth
of client 1 and client 2 is 10 million and 100 million, respectively, the results show that by
changing the order in which clients’ accounts are traded, the manager changes the total equity
allocation on behalf of her clients by about a million in the portfolio of 110 million under
management while she still honours her obligation to invest strictly according to each client’s
risk profile given the market conditions.
Relaxing the restriction on the functional form of p(q) and allowing for more than two
clients, we can state the following general result.37
Proposition 2: For a continuous nondecreasing p(q) such that p(0) = p and E
(
P˜T
)
6=
(1 + rf ) · p, let there be N clients with mean-variance investment preferences and zero initial
stock holdings and let M be the set of all permutations of the client ordering { i }Ni=1. Then
∀ρ1, . . . , ρN ,W1, . . . ,WN > 0 ∀m,m′ ∈M :
[
N∑
n=1
Q∗n
]
m
=
[
N∑
n=1
Q∗n
]
m′
(30)
if and only if the price impact p(q)− p is linear in its economically relevant domain given by
the range of
∑N
n=1Q
∗
n.
Proof: In the Appendix.
Due to welfare aggregation problems as illustrated in the previous section, it may be
difficult for the manager to correctly determine the true welfare-maximizing order in which
37While price impact might alternatively be specified in terms of the average price, note that by (6) and (7),
if the impact of trade on p is linear, it is so for P as well.
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clients’ accounts should be sequentially traded. Even if it were unambiguously possible,
however, the manager’s incentives may not be aligned with aggregate welfare maximization.
While she is in the position of a social planner, assuming that the effects under consideration
are small enough so that no client defects to a rival investment house, she may not necessarily
act in a benevolent fashion. In particular, having estimated a nonlinear price impact of her
trades, she is aware that client ordering will generally result in a different structure of the
total portfolio under her management and, therefore, she may pursue her own agenda subject
to the contractual constraint of optimizing individual portfolios conditional on current market
prices.
In some situations, the manager may wish to simply maximize the amount of risky assets
under her management without much strategic thought. In general, however, she will pursue
a longer-term strategy that takes into account the impact of her performance on her future
client base and fees. Most importantly, the structure of performance fees tends to be such
that it is personally more profitable for the manager to achieve above average returns with a
smaller total portfolio than average returns with a larger one.38 In our stylized setting with
a single risky asset, the performance fee for the manager might be a pre-specified fraction of
the excess profit (alpha pie) generated by the investment house, defined as in (16) but now
generalized for a nonlinear price impact p(q)− p. Changes in client ordering result not only
in a different slicing and distribution of the alpha pie among the clients but generally also in
its different size. Thus, the manager will select the client orderingm that results in
∑N
n=1Q
∗
n
generating dollar alpha closest to that generated with Q̂, which may or may not coincide with
maximization of the trading volume and/or client welfare.39
In sum, the contractual obligation to invest strictly according to clients’ risk profiles tends
to leave some, however narrow, room for maneuvering on the part of a large asset management
house with market impact and sophisticated managers can be expected to take advantage of
that in an optimal fashion, generally irrespective of client welfare.
7 Alternative Trading Arrangements
The scope of trading arrangements available to the manager is broader than trading one client
after another. In theory, she could split each client’s order into infinitesimal clips and trade
those sequentially across clients in such a way that at the end of the day, their portfolios are
optimized. That would enable her to vary the size of the alpha pie continuously.
More generally, with nonzero initial holdings, sequential trading might become rather
inefficient when clients’ portfolios are rebalanced. Firstly, some clients may wish to sell while
others buy and so by Proposition 1, the manager could reduce the aggregate market impact
costs through internalization, i.e. simultaneous in-house trading at the prevailing market
price, taking only the excess demand/supply out to the market. Secondly, there may be
situations in which a client demands extra equity on top of her current holding at the price
she faces if she is placed at the front of the queue by the manager, while the same client would
be willing to sell some of her current holding at the price she faces if she is placed at the
back of the queue.40 In the latter case, she would generally be willing to do so at a slightly
38See Perold and Salomon (1991).
39Implicitly, the manager is neutral to the risk of her own alpha forecasts. That, however, is not central to
the conclusions.
40With zero initial stock holdings, no shuﬄing of clients can result in a switch between buying and short-
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lower price as well and since the previous client has been purchasing stocks at such a price,
it might be efficient to additionally internalize some of their trading. Thus, even after the
initial internalization at p, purely sequential trading of the residual clients might still be an
inefficient trading arrangement.
Order splitting and internalization add further flexibility to the manager’s conduct, which
is nearly impossible to monitor for unsophisticated clients. However, to attract such clients,
some managers might advertise their commitment to provide equal market access to all their
clients, the credibility of which would come from the existence of supervisory authorities that
would fine and make public any deliberate client misinformation. Alternatively, regulatory
authorities might define equal market access in unambiguous terms and enact it as a default
standard with appropriate enforcement, unless stated explicitly otherwise in the prospectus
of the asset management company.
Fairness in the sense of pro-rata sharing of price impact costs can always be achieved
in this framework. In particular, let us assume that the manager has a self-imposed and/or
regulatory obligation to make a notional market in which all her clients obtain equal treatment
in terms of market access and, at the same time, she must exert her best effort to accomplish
the highest overall execution quality, i.e. minimum loss due to market impact. Let P = P i,
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, be a fixed price per share at which the manager offers to trade on behalf of
all her clients. Client i initially holds Q0i shares and riskfree bonds worth Bi, thus valuing
his portfolio at41
Wi = Bi + p ·Q0i > 0. (31)
The portfolio structure is the result of decisions made in the previous investment/rebalancing
periods and subsequent realization of uncertainty. In general, it will be optimal for the client
in the current period if the manager rebalances his portfolio by selling some shares to buy
more bonds or by selling some bonds to buy additional shares. Qi denotes demand for shares
net of the initial position Q0i and so wealth of client i at the end of the current rebalancing
period is42
W˜T i = (Bi − P ·Qi) · (1 + rf ) + P˜T · (Q0i +Qi). (32)
Given the above, the optimal rebalancing of the portfolio is determined by maximizing (44),
or equivalently (25), which results in the net aggregate order
N∑
i=1
Q∗i (P ) = A+B · P (33)
where
A =
E
(
P˜T
)
var
(
P˜T
) · N∑
i=1
Wi
ρi
−
N∑
i=1
Q0i,
B = − 1 + rf
var
(
P˜T
) · N∑
i=1
Wi
ρi
< 0.
selling of any client as shown in the Appendix.
41Shares in the initial portfolio are valued at p rather than P . The difference between those two prices is
merely due to a temporary impact of the manager’s current trading activity in the market and is considered
to be a transaction cost.
42If P ·Qi > Bi, the rebalanced position involves bonds sold short, which is equivalent to borrowing and so
shares are traded on margin. If Q0i = 0, then Wi = Bi and W˜Ti is specified as in the previous sections.
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The following result then holds.
Proposition 3: Let p(q) be continuously nondecreasing such that p(0) = p and let there be
a rule that internalization be conducted at the current market price or at the same terms as
the manager’s overall residual trading in the market. Then there exists a unique fixed share
price P ∗ > 0 at which the asset manager can optimally rebalance the portfolios of all clients
with mean-variance investment preferences while keeping market impact at a minimum.
Proof: In the Appendix.
This means that the manager is always able to set a price P ∗ at which internal crossing of
complementary orders takes place such that the residual order
∑N
i=1Q
∗
i (P
∗) can be traded in
the market at exactly that price per share, given the price impact. Such a single-price rule
eliminates discretion from the manager and reduces clients’ uncertainty about the manage-
ment of their assets. Should there be pure off-market internalization, it must take place at
the market price p.43
In practice, the single-price rule might stipulate that trading at different prices can only
take place after a minimum time interval has elapsed between the completion of trading on
behalf of one client and the start of trading on behalf of another client in order to make sure
that the manager is not strategically riding on the ‘price wave’ she made herself. In sum,
a possible arrangement for prevention of unconsented client discrimination can be made,
although its practical implementation might involve some challenges in terms of compliance
and enforcement.
8 Conclusion
We have pointed out an extra dimension for optimization by an asset manager with market
impact and multiple clients. While our model is stylized, it clearly demonstrates that formal
analysis of the manager’s problem, using estimated market impact, is likely to yield practical
benefits. This is so for asset managers seeking optimal strategies subject to existing regulatory
rules as well as for regulators and supervisors who create and enforce those rules.
We have built a framework in which a single asset manager is in charge of a given number
of client portfolios and we have shown how her incentives may be diverted from equitable
distribution of market impact costs and/or maximization of the overall client welfare if she
pursues the most favourable fee income prospects by maximizing her dollar alpha. Of course,
while sophisticated managers might take advantage of such opportunities, their unsophisti-
cated counterparts might simply ignore them and at the same time fail to actively ensure
fairness. Given the structure of the asset management industry, it might be equally plausible
if such subtle considerations were in many cases overshadowed by asset managers’ competi-
tion for large clients due to economies of scale and lower relative costs of defection of those
clients to a rival asset manager. Then, there would be incentives to simply grant priority in
market access to large clients at the expense of their small counterparts.
Anecdotal and off-the-record evidence suggests that provision of preferential market access
to selected clients has indeed been quietly practiced by a number of market participants,
43Technically, whenever A > 0, the manager could set P = −A
B
> 0 which by (33) would lead to a single-
price equilibrium with no trading in the market. This rule eliminates such a possibility unless p = −A
B
. If the
manager trades in the market, the single price is anchored beyond her control, thus eliminating any pricing
discretion on her part as long as she honours her obligation to optimize clients’ portfolios according to their
risk profiles.
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regulatory rules regarding fair client treatment notwithstanding. The contribution of this
paper is in explicit analysis of the problem and in demonstrating that such practices might in
some situations be motivated by little more than the managers’ pursuit of an optimal structure
of their total portfolio with neither themselves nor any third party directly profiting from the
client discrimination. In any case, irrespective of the motives for such discriminatory actions,
we have illustrated that without adequate monitoring, there is little reason to expect provision
of equal market access to all clients or maximization of their total welfare, if the latter could
be unambiguously specified, other than by coincidence.
It is common for commercial banks to offer higher interest rates and preferential treatment
to clients with larger deposits and, similarly, it is common for asset managers to provide more
favourable terms to clients with larger investment portfolios, not necessarily excluding prefer-
ential market access. Nevertheless, since preferential treatment of one group of clients, legiti-
mate as it may be, is equivalent to discrimination of the remaining (presumably uninformed)
clients, transparency about any systematic in-house distribution of market access is in prin-
ciple socially desirable.44 Unfortunately, practical enforcement of fairness/transparency rules
may be quite challenging. Potentially, trading records of randomly selected asset managers
could be analyzed by the supervisory authorities and properly designed computer algorithms
could detect any such tacit practice over an extended period of time, which should reduce
the frequency of failures to disclose such arrangements to all clients. In fact, mere public
awareness of this issue might prompt competitive forces towards that.
A Appendix
A.1 Logarithmic Preferences and Portfolio Choice
The first-order condition for the maximization of (1) is
dE
(
log W˜T
)
dϕ
= Φ
(
ϕ∗, P
)
= 0 (34)
where
Φ(ϕ, P ) = E

(
P˜T
P
− 1− rf
)
·
[
1 + rf + ϕ ·
(
P˜T
P
− 1− rf
)]−1 (35)
is a continuously differentiable function in the neighbourhood of
[
ϕ∗, P
]
with 1 + rf > 0,
P > 0 and stochastic (nondegenerate) P˜T > 0, which implies
∂Φ
∂ϕ
= −E

(
P˜T
P
− 1− rf
)2
·
[
1 + rf + ϕ ·
(
P˜T
P
− 1− rf
)]−2 < 0 (36)
44For instance, see Treating Customers Fairly at www.fsa.gov.uk:
Q: “Is it unfair that some customers have to pay more for certain financial products or services?”
A: “We view a firm’s decision to provide products (or not) and at what price (whether over the phone, internet
or by email) as a commercial decision by that firm. Furthermore, to treat customers fairly does not mean
that a firm is required to offer the same products or levels of service to all customers, as long as it delivers
the product or level of service promised, and that customers are protected from unpleasant surprises from the
products they buy.”
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and
∂Φ
∂P
= −1 + rf
P 2
· E
P˜T ·
[
1 + rf + ϕ ·
(
P˜T
P
− 1− rf
)]−2 < 0. (37)
Hence, by the Implicit Function Theorem, there exists a continuously differentiable function
ϕ = ϕ(P ) in the neighbourhood of P > 0 such that Φ[ϕ(P ), P ] ≡ 0, ϕ (P ) = ϕ∗ and
dϕ
(
P
)
dP
= −
∂Φ(ϕ∗,P)
∂P
∂Φ(ϕ∗,P)
∂ϕ
< 0. (38)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1: Without loss of generality, let Q1 > −Q2 > 0 where Q1 and Q2 are
sums of all buy and sell orders, respectively. Given
C(Q) =
∫ Q
0
p(q) dq − p ·Q, (39)
the aggregate price impact costs are
L(N) = C(Q1 −N) + C(Q2 +N) (40)
where the first and second term are the costs of price impact on the ask and bid side of the
order book, respectively. By the properties of p,
L′(N) = p(Q2 +N)− p(Q1 −N) ≤ 0 (41)
for N ∈ [0,−Q2] and so in that interval, L(N) is minimized at N = −Q2.
Note that the minimum is not necessarily unique. A sufficient condition for uniqueness
would, for instance, be strict monotonicity of p which would turn the weak inequality in (41)
into a strict one.
A.3 Aggregate Values under Mean-Variance Preferences (17)
Using (20), we obtain
[Q∗1 +Q
∗
2]ij =
[
E
(
P˜T
)
− (1 + rf ) · p
]
·
[
(1 + rf ) · δ−1 + (ρi + ρj) · var
(
P˜T
)]
[
(1 + rf ) · δ−1 + ρi · var
(
P˜T
)]
·
[
(1 + rf ) · δ−1 + ρj · var
(
P˜T
)] (42)
and (21) follows immediately. Plugging (20) into (18) and substituting the resulting expression
into (17) leads to
[V ∗1 + V
∗
2 ]12 − [V ∗1 + V ∗2 ]21 =
(ρ2 − ρ1) · var
(
P˜T
)
· (1 + rf )2 ·
[
E
(
P˜T
)
− (1 + rf ) · p
]2
2 · δ2 ·
[
(1 + rf ) · δ−1 + ρ1 · var
(
P˜T
)]2 · [(1 + rf ) · δ−1 + ρ2 · var(P˜T)]2 (43)
and hence (22).
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A.4 Qi as Control under Mean-Variance Preferences (25)
Given W˜T i = Wi · (1 + r˜pi), (25) can be rewritten as45
Vi(Qi) = E
(
W˜T i
)
− ρi
2
·
var
(
W˜T i
)
Wi
(44)
where
W˜T i =
(
Wi − P i ·Qi
) · (1 + rf ) + P˜T ·Qi (45)
and if i = mn in the client ordering m = [m1, . . . ,mN ] ∈M , then46
P i =
1
Qi
·
∫ ∑n−1
j=1 Qmj+Qi∑n−1
j=1 Qmj
p(q) dq. (46)
By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus,
d
(
P i ·Qi
)
dQi
= p
n−1∑
j=1
Qmj +Qi
 (47)
and hence the first-order condition for a maximum of (44) gives47
p
n−1∑
j=1
Qmj +Q
∗
i
 = E
(
P˜T
)
1 + rf
−
ρi · var
(
P˜T
)
Wi · (1 + rf ) ·Q
∗
i . (48)
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Given 1 + rf , p, E
(
P˜T
)
, var
(
P˜T
)
> 0, let
K =
q ∈ R : sgn q = sgn
E
(
P˜T
)
1 + rf
− p(q)
 = sgn
E
(
P˜T
)
1 + rf
− p
 . (49)
Lemma 1: Let N = 2 and, without loss of generality, m = [m1,m2] = [1, 2], i.e. I(1) =
1− I(2) = 0.
i) ∀ρ1, ρ2,W1,W2 > 0 ∃!Q∗1 ∃!Q∗2 and Q∗1, Q∗2, Q∗1 +Q∗2 ∈ K.
ii) ∀q,Q ∈ K, |Q| > |q| > 0, ∃! ρ1W1 > 0 : Q∗1 = q, ∃!
ρ2
W2
> 0 : Q∗1 +Q∗2 = Q and varying q from
0 to Q implicitly defines ρ2W2 as a strictly decreasing continuous function of
ρ1
W1
with the
domain and range (lQ,+∞) such that ρ1W1 = lQ results in Q∗1 = Q.
45Note that (25) is thus obtained from (17) by replacing ρi with
ρi
Wi
and, therefore, such a replacement of
parameters in the relevant results obtained in Section 5 under the latter specification immediately leads to the
results that would be obtained under the former.
46Assuming Qi 6= 0. For n = 1, ∑n−1j=1 Qmj is replaced with 0. Note that ϕi = P i·QiWi .
47The second-order condition is satisfied given a continuously nondecreasing p(q).
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Proof: Let us rewrite (48) as
Q∗i =
Wi · (1 + rf )
ρi · var
(
P˜T
) ·
E
(
P˜T
)
1 + rf
− p [I(i) ·Qj +Q∗i ]
 . (50)
i) The existence of a unique optimal portfolio for client 1 such that Q∗1 ∈ K springs imme-
diately from (50) for [i, j] = [1, 2], the property of p(q) being continuously nondecreasing
and the Intermediate Value Theorem. Similarly, the latter two combined with (50) for
[j, i] = [1, 2], given Q∗1 ∈ K, result in a unique optimal portfolio for client 2 such that
Q∗2 ∈ K and Q∗1 +Q∗2 ∈ K.
ii) (50) for [i, j] = [1, 2] and the properties of K immediately imply a unique ρ1W1 > 0 for a
given q ∈ K, q 6= 0, such that limq→0 ρ1W1 = +∞,
ρ1
W1
strictly decreases with |q| and its
infimum in the relevant interval is lQ. Given Q
∗
2 = Q− q, the properties of K combined
with (50) for [j, i] = [1, 2] result in a unique ρ2W2 > 0. Given Q, |Q∗2| strictly decreases
in |q| and it is also straightforward to see from (50) that ρ2W2 strictly decreases in |Q∗2|.
Thus, ρ2W2 is implicitly defined as a continuous function of
ρ1
W1
strictly decreasing in its
domain (lQ,+∞) which equals its range.
Lemma 2: For E
(
P˜T
)
6= (1 + rf ) · p, if
∀ρ1, ρ2,W1,W2 > 0 : [Q∗1 +Q∗2]12 = [Q∗1 +Q∗2]21 , (51)
then the price impact p(q)− p is linear in its economically relevant domain given by the range
of Q∗1 +Q∗2.
Proof: Assume that (51) holds and p(q)− p is not linear in K 6= {0}, which is the range
of Q∗1 +Q∗2 by Lemma 1. Then (50) for [j, i] = [1, 2], which is a notation implying I(1) =
1− I(2) = 0, and (50) for [j, i] = [2, 1] result, together with (51), in
[Q∗1 +Q∗2]21 − [Q∗1]12
[Q∗1 +Q∗2]12 − [Q∗2]21
=
ρ1 ·W2
ρ2 ·W1 . (52)
Similarly, the combination of (50) for [i, j] = [1, 2] and for [j, i] = [2, 1] gives
p([Q∗1 +Q
∗
2]21)− p([Q∗1]12) =
ρ1 · var
(
P˜T
)
W1 · (1 + rf ) · ([Q
∗
1]12 − [Q∗1]21) (53)
and the combination of (50) for [j, i] = [1, 2] and for [i, j] = [2, 1] gives
p([Q∗1 +Q
∗
2]12)− p([Q∗2]21) =
ρ2 · var
(
P˜T
)
W2 · (1 + rf ) · ([Q
∗
2]21 − [Q∗2]12). (54)
By (51), [Q∗1]12 − [Q∗1]21 = [Q∗2]21 − [Q∗2]12 and so (52), (53) and (54) yield
p([Q∗1 +Q∗2]21)− p([Q∗1]12)
[Q∗1 +Q∗2]21 − [Q∗1]12
=
p([Q∗1 +Q∗2]12)− p([Q∗2]21)
[Q∗1 +Q∗2]12 − [Q∗2]21
. (55)
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It follows from Lemma 1 that for all Q ∈ K 6= {0} such that
[Q∗1 +Q
∗
2]12 = [Q
∗
1 +Q
∗
2]21 = Q, (56)
varying ρ1W1 continuously from lQ to +∞ implies
ρ2
W2
being continuously varied over the same
interval in the opposite direction and hence [Q∗1]12 varies continuously from Q to 0 as [Q∗2]21
varies continuously from 0 to Q. But then (55) immediately implies that p(q) has a constant
slope in K 6= {0}, i.e. it is affine, and so p(q)− p is linear, which is a contradiction.
With the above auxiliary results, we can proceed to the main proof.
Proof of Proposition 2: Using (48), a trivial extension of the relevant parts of the proof of
Lemma 1 reveals that K is the range of
∑N
n=1Q
∗
n for N ∈ N.48 Lemma 2 proves necessity for
the special case of N = 2. Let us assume more generally that for some N ≥ 2, if (30) holds,
then p(q) is affine in K. Now we demonstrate that such an implication must hold for N + 1
as well. In particular, if the premise of the implication holds for all m,m′ ∈M and for all
ρ1
W1
, . . . ,
ρN+1
WN+1
> 0, then it holds in a subset of the set of permutations in which the newly
added client N + 1 is traded first and at the same time in a subset of the parameter space
in which
ρN+1
WN+1
is held fixed so that Q∗N+1 = q1. Since the implication holds for N , it follows
immediately that p(q) is affine in K1 defined by replacing p with p(q1) in the definition of K in
(49). Letting
ρN+1
WN+1
→ +∞, we obtain q1 → 0, p(q1)→ p and hence K1 → K. By induction,
this proves necessity for N ∈ N\{1}.
To prove sufficiency, let p(q) be affine such that p(q) = p+ β · q, β ≥ 0. For β = 0, indi-
vidual demands are independent ofm and sufficiency follows immediately. For β > 0,49 given
m = [m1, . . . ,mN ] ∈M , (48) leads to the recursive formula
n∑
i=1
Q∗mi =
E
(
P˜T
)
− (1 + rf ) · p+ ρmnWmn · var
(
P˜T
)
·∑n−1i=1 Q∗mi
(1 + rf ) · β + ρmnWmn · var
(
P˜T
) . (57)
By repeated substitution, we obtain50
N∑
i=1
Q∗mi =
E
(
P˜T
)
− (1 + rf ) · p∏N
i=1
[
(1 + rf ) · β + ρmiWmi · var
(
P˜T
)] ·{ N∏
i=2
[
ρmi
Wmi
· var
(
P˜T
)]
+
N−2∑
n=1
N∏
i=n+2
[
ρmi
Wmi
· var
(
P˜T
)]
·
n∏
i=1
[
(1 + rf ) · β + ρmi
Wmi
· var
(
P˜T
)]
+
N−1∏
i=1
[
(1 + rf ) · β + ρmi
Wmi
· var
(
P˜T
)]}
. (58)
For all n ∈ N, n ≤ N , let Γnm =
{
Cnj
}
j∈{1,...,(Nn)}
be the family of all n-subsets (n-combinations)
48Note that the economic restriction p(q) > 0 never binds.
49As in (6).
50For N = 2, the middle term (summation) inside the braces vanishes.
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Cn of the elements of m ∈M . Then (58) can be rewritten as[
N∑
n=1
Q∗n
]
m
=
[
E
(
P˜T
)
− (1 + rf ) · p
]
· [(1 + rf ) · β]N−1∏N
n=1
[
(1 + rf ) · β + ρnWn · var
(
P˜T
)]
·
1 +
N−1∑
n=1
[(1 + rf ) · β]−n · ∑
Cn∈Γnm
∏
i∈Cn
[
ρi
Wi
· var
(
P˜T
)] . (59)
Trivially, ∀n ∈ N, n ≤ N , ∀m,m′ ∈M : Γnm = Γnm′ , which completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Lemma 3: Let p(q) > 0 be continuous and nondecreasing on
(
q, q
)
for any q < 0 and q > 0.
Then
P (Q) =
1
Q
·
∫ Q
0
p(q) dq > 0 (60)
is continuous and nondecreasing on
(
q, 0
)
and (0, q).
Proof: The sign and continuity follow immediately from the integral properties. Assume that
∃Q ∈ (q, 0) ∪ (0, q):
dP (Q)
dQ
=
1
Q
· [p(Q)− P (Q)] < 0. (61)
By the Mean Value Theorem, there exists q strictly between 0 and Q such that p(q) = P (Q).
It follows from (61) that p(q) > p(Q) if Q > 0 and p(q) < p(Q) if Q < 0, which contradicts
the monotonicity of p.
Now we can proceed to the main proof.
Proof of Proposition 3: By (33), which gives the residual market order on behalf of the clients
after maximal internalization has been conducted so that market impact costs are minimized
by Proposition 1, we have
∑N
i=1Q
∗
i (P ) = 0 if and only if P = −AB . Let us define an auxiliary
function
Ψ(P ) =
{
P
[∑N
i=1Q
∗
i (P )
]
for P 6= −AB
p for P = −AB
. (62)
By l’Hospital’s Rule,
lim
Q→0
P (Q) = p(0) = p (63)
and hence (33) with Lemma 3 imply that Ψ(P ) > 0 is continuously nonincreasing in the eco-
nomically relevant interval [0,+∞). By the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem, ∃P ∗ ∈ [0,Ψ(0)] :
P ∗ = Ψ(P ∗). Furthermore, the monotonicity of Ψ guarantees a unique P ∗ > 0.
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